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In the aftermath of the March 1982 election in El Salvador there 
was a major debate in the U.S. concerning the significance of this 
election. The central issue of this debate concerned the turnout. Sup-
porters of the Reagan Administration's Central America policy argued 
the fact that 1.5 million people voted in this election was a repudiation 
of the insurgents and a vote of confidence in the government. The 
opponents of the Administration argued that the turnout figures had 
been inflated by vote fraud and that, moreover, many people had 
been coerced into voting by the government.1 
Interestingly, both sides in this debate assumed that a high turn-
out in an election during a civil war was in some sense unusual. How-
ever, such is not the case. In many civil war elections in the past several 
decades there has usually been a very high turnout. In the January 
1919 election in Weimar Germany, held in the midst, of the German 
Revolution of 1918-1920, turnout was 83%; in contrast, in the three 
peacetime elections of 1924 (May), 1924 (December) and 1928 turnout 
was 76%, 78% and 75% respectively.2 In the 1963 election in Vene-
zuela, held during the height of the conflict between Romulo Betan-
court's social democratic government and the radical left, turnout was 
90%.3 In the 1971 election in Uruguay, which took place during the 
climax of the struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas, there was an 
88% turnout—the highest in the country's history.4 Finally, in the 
Portuguese elections of 1975, held in the midst of the confrontation 
between the alliance of democratic parties headed by Mario Soares 
and the Portuguese communists, turnout was 92%, while in the peace-
time election of 1976 turnout was 83%.5 
The problems that Americans have in understanding civil war 
elections stem from two factors. First, in American political culture it 
is assumed that there is a sharp, radical distinction between peaceful 
change (elections) and violent change (civil war). Consequently, Amer-
icans either tend to dismiss a civil war election as meaningless or to 
go to the other extreme and see an election in and of itself as the way 
to end a civil war. Second, Americans tend to misapply their own 
electoral experiences to civil war elections. For example, in the debates 
over the 1979 and 1980 elections in Zimbabwe and over the 1982 
election in El Salvador many comparisons were made between the 
turnout in these elections and the turnouts in U.S. elections. What 
such comparisons overlooked was that in the post-World War II pe-
riod the United States has had one of the lowest turnout levels of any 
of the democratic countries; hence, it is hardly surprising that there 
were higher turnout in Zimbabwe and El Salvador elections than in 
a typical U.S. election.1' 
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If one is to accurately interpret the results of a civil war election 
it is first necessary to understand the political significance of such an 
election. In a civil war an election is seldom a meaningless event—but 
neither is it an exclusive means of resolving the civil war. Instead, in 
a civil war an election serves as a test of strength between the groups 
involved in such war. Therefore, like all tests of strength, the results 
can be inconclusive, though they can also have a crucial impact on 
the course of the civil war by demoralizing one side and encouraging 
the other. 
Put differently, the real analogy in American politics to a civil 
war election is not the fall general election but rather the presidential 
primary. A presidential primary is a test of strength in the context of 
an ongoing struggle between different factions within the Democratic 
or Republican parties. In terms of its intrinsic importance (which is 
the number of delegates won by the various candidates running in 
the primary) a presidential primary seldom decides the race for the 
nomination. However, the outcome of a presidential primary can play 
a major, and occasionally decisive, role in the battle for the party's 
nomination by dissuading certain candidates and heartening others. 
For example, John F. Kennedy's victory in the 1960 West Virginia 
primary was one of the decisive battles in his campaign for the Dem-
ocratic party's presidential nomination because this victory demon-
strated that he could win the support of voters who were Democrats 
yet had traditionally been suspicious of Roman Catholics. 
After a presidential primary an assessment of the results is un-
dertaken by examining a number of key factors such as overall turn-
out, areas of candidate support and results of the previous primaries. 
A comparative analysis of a number of civil war elections indicates 
that there are also several key factors to be taken into account when 
attempting to assess the results of such an election. The nine civil war 
elections that were analyzed are as follows: 
1. T h e 1917 Constituent Assembly election in Russia (held in the 
midst of the Russian Revolution); 
2. T h e 1919 election in Weimar Germany (held during the German 
revolution of 1918-1920); 
3. The 1951 election in the Philippines (held during the Huk insur-
gency); 
4. The 1963 election in Venezuela (held during the civil war between 
the Betancourt government and the radical left); 
5. The 1971 election in Uruguay (held during the Tupamaro insur-
gency); 
6. Two province-wide elections in Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1974; 
7. The Portuguese election of 1975 (held in the course of the bitter 
struggle between the Portuguese democratic parties and the Por-
tuguese communists in 1974-1975); 
8. The Zimbabwe elections of 1979 and 1980 (both of which were 
held with the intent of resolving the civil war that had been un-
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derway since the government of Ian Smith declared its independ-
ence in 1965); 
9. The El Salvador election of 1982 (held in the midst of a major 
insurgency that had begun in the late 1970s). 
This comparative analysis concluded that the key factors to con-
sider are: issues, turnout, breakdown of the vote, other social insti-
tutions, honesty of the elections, and leadership. Each factor will be 
dealt with separately. 
The first important fact to keep in mind concerning civil war 
elections is the environment of ongoing violence where various groups 
involved in the conflict must realize that, if they are defeated, they 
will be the targets of further violence from the victors. The central 
issue of the elections, then, tends to be individual and group security 
rather than social and economic issues. In other words, people will 
be inclined to cast their ballots on the basis of encouraging those 
parties that they feel will be most successful in defeating the oppo-
sition, even if they normally would not vote for such parties. In the 
1917 Constituent Assembly election in Russia many of the very con-
servative groups in society voted for the moderate Constitutional 
Democrats (Kadets) rather than for the rightist parties because they 
felt that the Kadets would be more effective in opposing the Bolshe-
viks.7 In the 1975 Portuguese election Mario Soares' Socialist Party 
received such a high percentage of the total vote (38%) in large part 
because of the key role the Socialists were playing in opposing the 
attempt of the Portuguese Communist Party to seize power. (In the 
peacetime elections of 1976 and 1979 the Socialist Party received 35% 
and 25% of the vote respectively.)8 Again, the sizable vote (26%) for 
Major Roberto D'Aubisson's ARENA Party in the March 1982 election 
in El Salvador was due, to a considerable extent, to D'Auguisson's 
image as the sort of tough leader who could prevent the insurgents 
from winning.9 
In a country in the throes of a civil war political issues become 
central to people's everyday existence. Hence, it should not be sur-
prising that election turnout in such highly politicized societies is usu-
ally quite high. Because high turnout rates under these conditions 
will be interpreted by the government as an endorsement of the cur-
rent political system, the insurgents often try to reduce the percentage 
through propaganda and/or terrorism. Therefore turnout levels are 
often a crucial indicator of the strength of the different sides in the 
civil war, with the side that loses the "turnout battle" being sometimes 
seriously demoralized. In the 1963 election in Venezuela the radical 
left attempted to disrupt the election by threatening violence against 
voters and polling places. The 90% turnout in this election was thus 
a devastating blow to the morale of the radical left and a great morale 
boost to the Betancourt government. Consequently, after the election, 
the radical left ceased to be a serious threat to the Betancourt gov-
ernment.10 In 1979 an election was held in Zimbabwe after an agree-
ment had been worked out between Ian Smith's government and some 
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moderate black leaders. In this election turnout was 65% which, at 
the time, was interpreted by many people in the United States as a 
solid endorsement of the new government of Bishop Muzorewa. How-
ever, in 1980 a second election was organized in Zimbabwe to imple-
ment the Lancaster House Settlement negotiated by the British 
government. Voter participation was 93% and the overwhelming win-
ner was Robert Mugabe. So, in retrospect, the lower percentage in 
1979 indicated that, at the time of the internal settlement, much of 
Zimbabwe's population was unwilling to go along with this internal 
settlement. Dissatisfaction among the black population grew stronger 
when it became clear that Muzorewa could not deliver on his promises 
to get sanctions lifted, to gain international recognition and to end 
the civil war. This dissatisfaction with the internal settlement culmi-
nated in Mugabe's massive victory in the 1980 election." 
In analyzing any civil war election it is crucial to look carefully at 
the breakdown of the electoral returns in terms of their distribution 
among the parties and groups participating in the election and interms 
of the geographic distribution of the vote. The 1917 Constituent As-
sembly election in Russia is a good example of the importance of 
carefully analyzing the breakdown of the electoral returns. At first 
glance, this election would appear to have been a stunning setback 
for the Bolsheviks. They received approximately 25% of the vote, 
while the various non-Bolshevik parties (the Social Revolutionaries, 
the Mensheviks, the Kadets and the parties representing nationality 
groups) got 75%.12 However, a closer examination of the returns 
reveals that the Bolsheviks had every reason to be encouraged by the 
outcome. While the Bolsheviks had polled only one-quarter of the 
vote, the Bolshevik party receiving this vote was a unified and highly 
disciplined force. In contrast, the largest non-Bolshevik party, the 
Social Revolutionaries (which received about 50% of the vote), was 
characterized by serious internal splits and ongoing faction fights. Not 
only were the Social Revolutionaries divided internally, but in addition 
they were suspicious and hostile toward the moderate and rightist 
groups such as the Kadets. Indeed, many Social Revolutionaries re-
garded the Bolsheviks as preferable to the Kadets. So while the Bol-
sheviks received only 25% of the vote, their ability to mobilize their 
supporters was much greater than the opposition's because of the 
internal strength.13 
The geographic distribution of the vote was also highly favorable 
to the Bolsheviks. Their electoral strength was concentrated in the 
industrial areas around Petrograd and Moscow. The opposition's sup-
port, in contrast, was badly distributed. The Social Revolutionaries 
drew their support mainly from the peasantry and, thus, their sup-
porters were scattered all over Russia. The Kadets got their greatest 
strength from the middle classes in Petrograd and Moscow. These 
groups were substantial but were still a minority of the population of 
these cities. The Bolsheviks, then, were able to crush these groups 
early on in the civil war because they were located in the areas'where 
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the Bolsheviks were the dominant force.14 In other words, the geo-
graphic distribution of the opposition enabled the Bolsheviks to carry 
out the military strategy of defeating the enemy "in detail." Early in 
the civil war they were able to destroy their middle class opponents 
in Petrograd and Moscow (these being the groups most firmly opposed 
to the Bolsheviks), and then were able to move against their divided, 
vacillating opposition in the rural regions of Russia. 
Finally, in the 1917 Russian election there were separate returns 
for the army and navy. The Bolsheviks received about half of the vote 
of the military. Most of the rest went to the Social Revolutionaries. 
Those moderate and rightist forces most unequivocally opposed to 
the Bolsheviks got only about 1 % of the votes of the military. More-
over, the Bolshevik's military support was concentrated in the same 
general regions as was their electoral support. Those elements of the 
military with which the Bolsheviks did not do well were located in 
distant regions of the country such as Roumanian front and the Cau-
casus.15 
In sum, a breakdown of the vote in the 1917 Russian Constituent 
Assembly election shows that the Bolsheviks started the civil war in a 
very strong position. They were a unified, disciplined and geograph-
ically concentrated minority fighting against a majority that was badly 
divided both politically and geographically. 
Since a civil war election is one stage in an ongoing struggle, it 
is essential in analyzing the results of such an election to be cognizant 
of other potential sources of power in a civil war besides the levels of 
popular support achieved by the various sides. The military is ob-
viously a source of power in a civil war and, it follows, the political 
loyalties of the military will be a critical factor in determining the 
outcome of the civil war. For example, the Portuguese election of 
1975 was a major setback to the Portuguese communists for a number 
of reasons. The communists and their radical left allies did poorly 
(17%) as compared to the alliance of the Portuguese socialists, liberals 
and conservatives (72%). The three non-communist parties won over-
whelmingly in the northern two-thirds of the country. In those regions 
in the south of Portugal where the communists did well, they still 
remained a minority of the overall population of southern Portugal. 
In the language of military geography the communists "lacked a se-
cure rear area" and were in a bad strategic position in the event of a 
civil war. Reinforcing these election results was another key factor: 
unlike Russia in 1917, these groups in Portugal in 1975 who were 
determined to prevent a communist seizure of power had the support 
of much of the Portuguese military.16 
Labor unions provide another important source of strength in a 
civil war. In December 1973 the British worked out a compromise in 
Northern Ireland whereby a government of moderate Catholics and 
Protestants was established in the province. The Protestant hardliners 
were strongly opposed to this new provincial government but, because 
they had received only 35% of the vote, they were reluctant to confront 
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it. However, in the February 1974 British parliamentary election the 
Protestant hardliners got 51% of the vote and won 11 out of the 12 
Ulster seats in the British parliament. Encouraged by this electoral 
victory, the Protestant hardliners decided to use their control of the 
labor movement in Ulster to bring down the new government. After 
a 14 day general strike in the spring of 1974, organized by the Prot-
estant-controlled Ulster Worker's Council, the provincial government 
resigned and the British were forced to return to ruling Ulster directly 
from London.17 
As has been recognized by a number of major twentieth century 
revolutionaries, it is difficult to mobilize popular opposition to a gov-
ernment that has come to power through free and honest elections. 
It is precisely for this reason that revolutionaries struggling against a 
government often attempt (as in the case of Venezuela in 1963) to 
disrupt an election by acts of terrorism. The 1951 election in the 
Philippines was a key turning point in the struggle against the Huk 
guerrillas. In this election Ramon Magsaysay had the Philippine mil-
itary supervise the election to guarantee an honest outcome. An in-
cident in this election provides a dramatic illustration of how an honest 
election can be a major setback for a revolutionary movement. An old 
Philippine peasant had been providing assistance to the Huk guerrillas 
for a number of years. He had nothing but scorn for the electoral 
process in the Philippines. It was obvious to him that in his region 
the elections were rigged. After the results of the 1951 election were 
reported the old peasant was shocked; the candidates he had sup-
ported had won. When the Huks came to him a few days later to ask 
for assistance he refused, saying that the government now represented 
the wishes of the population. When he refused to be moved by per-
suasion or threats, the Huks beat him severely and left him for dead. 
(He did die a few days later in a hospital, but, before dying, he told 
his story to an American military officer.)18 
Finally, there is the question of the leadership of the different 
groups participating in a civil war election. Whether in a civil war 
election or in a peacetime election, an electoral mandate, no matter 
how large, is not self-implementing. Implementation can only be the 
result of skillful leadership. In looking at the Philippine election of 
1951, the Venezuelan election of 1963 and the Portuguese election 
of 1951, it is striking that in all of these cases the elections were an 
ultimately fatal setback for the insurgents, in large measure because 
these countries had leaders (Ramon Magsaysay, Romulo Betancourt 
and Mario Soares) capable of effectively using the legitimacy con-
ferred upon their governments by these elections. In addition to all 
of its other difficulties, the opposition to the Bolsheviks was severely 
handicapped by the fact that it did not have a leader with the effec-
tiveness and skill of a Magsaysay, a Betancourt or a Soares. 
Being able to assess a civil war election as accurately as possible 
is often a crucial task for American officials responsible for protecting 
the national security of the United States. For example, in the 1974-
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75 crisis in Portugal the United States was in the difficult position of 
trying to influence internal politics of a country in which, because of 
U.S. support for the former regime, there was considerable hostility 
toward the United States. In such a situation, a wrong move by the 
United States could greatly benefit those groups hostile to it. Fortu-
nately, in this crisis, U.S. officials on the scent quickly grasped the 
importance of the 1975 election and, thus, were able to help the 
democratic forces in Portugal use the legitimacy conferred by this 
election to defeat the attempt of Portuguese communists to seize 
power.19 In light of the need to assess accurately civil war elections 
such as those which have taken place in recent years in Portugal, 
Zimbabwe and El Salvador, it is essential that U.S. policy-makers look 
at such elections not in the context of peacetime American elections 
but, rather, in the context of the generalizations discussed which can 
be drawn from comparative analyses of such civil war elections. 
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